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Existence of Structural Disadvantage among socio-religious groups: Is it a reality? 
An Analysis of Indian Labour Market 
 
Alwin Dsouza1*, Sudershan Singh2 and Rahul Ranjan1 
1. Introduction: 
There are two major components for a country which define its production capacity and well-
being of people. These are the social conditions and labour market scenario of the country. 
Both these components are further mutually interdependent on each other. To have a clear 
understanding of labour market situation one needs to have good understanding of the social 
conditions of the country and vice-versa. 
The Indian labour market despite high growth rates of GDP during past two decades is still in 
the primitive phases of development as indicated by the majority of labour force being still 
dependent upon less productive and less remunerative informal sector (Kunal, et al. 2013). 
There is a major difference between informal sectors of developed and developing 
economies: in developed economies informal sector attracts entrepreneurs andemploymore 
skilled individualshence is more remunerative while the informal sector in developing 
countries like in India attract workers who are unskilled, less educated and are paid extremely 
low thanks to the over supply of workers relative to the demand. Lack of unity among them 
in developing countries have made them compromise under employment relations which do 
not follow the nationl labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to 
certain employment benefits (ILO, 1972). The informal sectors mainly constitute workers 
who are engaged in micro enterprises, unpaid family members, casual labourers, migrant 
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labourers, small or landless farmers, traditional artisans etc. The formal sector in developing 
countries arethe major producer of “good jobs”or regular salaried jobs and are preferred by 
the more educated (Borooah, et al. 2007)while the informal sector, is basically populated by 
those who are unable to find jobs in the formal sector. Earlier arguments which stated that the 
informal sector works as an initial stage for in-migrants before moving to the formal sector 
(Todaro, 1960) have become inconclusive (Biswajit, 1983, and Pedro and Erwan, 
2006).Informal sector workers just stick to this sector because of lack of opportunities from 
the formal sector and therefore  it constitutes more than 85% (NCEUS, 2008) of the work 
force. What is even more appalling is that the informal sector is expanding sharply after 
initiation of economic reforms (James and Robert, 2003), (ILO, 2008). 
Given the unregulated and less productive nature of the informal sector (James and Robert, 
2003), it could have serious implications for the economy and on those participating. 
Furthermore, due to lack of proper regulations of informal labour markets those working in 
this sector may be more likely to be exposed to more exploitation and differential behaviour. 
This differentiated behaviour could also be a reflection of the ills of caste system of Indian 
society which have been prevalent for centuries. This problem may get magnified when caste 
is compounded with religion.In such a scenario it is important to identify these groups which 
are probably facing this kind of differential treatment or disadvantage for long. Identification 
of these groups and magnitude of the differential treatment faced by them as compared to 
others would help policymakers to frame truly socially inclusivepoliciesas these groups may 
form the majorityof India’s poor and disadvantaged. This paper attempts to identify whether 
any groups have been facing possible differential treatment  by certain groups in the labour 
market. We would also would like to test whether poor education or development is a cause 
for such differential treatment. 
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With this introduction this paper is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 reviewsprevious 
literature. Section 3 explainsthe data source and methodology used for analysis followed by 
descriptive statistics and detailed analysis in sections 4 and 5 respectively. Finally, a section 
on discussion and conclusion in section 6. 
2. Background and Contribution to Literature: 
Importance of Informal sector in Indian Economy and possible existence of “structural 
disadvantage” 
Migration model pioneered by Harris Todaro (1969) stated that migration involves atwo step 
phenomenon. Either migrants initially spend some time in the so-called urban informal sector 
or remain unemployed till one gets a job in formal sector. So, informal sector was considered 
as “the transition sector”.  But empirical studies done for developing countries which support 
this hypothesis are rare (Biswajit, 1983) and (Pedro and Erwan, 2006). According to the 
market  segmentedhypothesis, the two sectors (Formal and Informal) are very different with 
respect to wage determination. Informal sector rewards human capital at a very low rate 
compared to formal sector. Giving rise to a wide real wage differential between the two. 
Under the market segmentation hypothesis approach, informal sector behaves just like 
“secondary sector” while formal as “primary sector”. Secondary sector is characterized by 
“low wages, poor working conditions and unstable employment and little opportunity for 
advancement into higher paying jobs” while primary sector is characterized with “highly 
negotiated wages with economic security and rapid turnover leading to career advancement” 
(Leontaridi, 1998).Again, secondary labour market has a completely flat low wage profile 
while the primary market has a wage profile linked to the differentials in human capital. This 
makes informal sector a less attractive option. Therefore, jobs in formal sector have been 
defined as good jobs while that of informal sector as “bad jobs”. This classificationinto good 
jobs and bad jobs is not with respect to skills required but with respect to “labour market 
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institutions such as labour unions and government laws such as minimum wage legislation 
and laws on in-migration” (Leontaridi, 1998). These institutions create a difference between 
“good” and “bad” jobs. Biswajit (1983) have tried to prove the validity of this in India and 
has concluded that market segmentation hypothesis is only partially valid in Delhi, India 
because informal sector entrants are attracted to Delhi due to the opportunities offered by the 
sector itself. But it is also true that there have been  low mobility from informal to formal 
sector.  
Another important aspect is the size of the informal sector. The magnitude of the informal 
sector varies with the degree of development. James and Robert, (2003)and ILO (2008)have 
agreed to the fact that the magnitude of informal sector is inversely proportional to the 
growth of GDP of that economy.Therefore informal sector is characterized by having “bad 
jobs” with low pay and less incentive for employment growth. Given this fact, it is 
hypothesized that informal sector due to its nature and size may give enough scope for 
discrimination against economically and socially disadvantaged people. In literature this is 
termed as structural discrimination. According to Devahand Hana (2008) a group is 
structurally discriminated not only by the wilful acts of particular individuals but because 
ofaprevailing system of opportunities and constraints favours the success of one group over 
another group. In our paper we term this as structural disadvantage because that particular 
group is in a dis-advantageous position because of “a legacy of historical discrimination, 
contemporary state policies and practices and accumulation of disadvantage (Devah and 
Hana, 2008), (Fred, 1996)”.Since there have been strict laws against discrimination in the 
Constitution ie Article 14, 15, 16 and 25, no one can legally do this. Given these laws are 
known to all, still  if data suggests that discrimination prevails in society, it must be structural 
in nature.  Instances of structural discrimination includes caste system in India or apartheid in 
South Africa. In both cases, laws and cultural institutions produced and imposed systematic 
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inequalities based on group membership (Devah and Hana, 2008),(Bordia, 2013).Structural 
disadvantage in labourmarkets could be due to active or passive reasons. When members 
from a particular are group is socially excluded from being hired given the same qualification 
it is  defined as an active disadvantage while passive disadvantage occurs when a group is 
favoured lowering the self-confidence of certain sections. This has a negative impact on their 
performance(Sukhadeo and Katherine, 2007). Market failures created due to preferential 
treatment given to certain groups could lead to inefficient allocation of labour along with a 
fall in wages below the marginal product for those who are facing disadvantage. “By 
preventing free mobility of human labour, land, capital and entrepreneurship, the caste 
system creates imperfect segmented and monopolistic divisions in factor markets. This leads 
to gross inefficiency (Akerlof, 1976), (Scoville, 1991), Lal (1989) and Ambedkar (1936 and 
1987)” (Sukhadeo and Katherine, 2007). Given this background for study, there is a need to 
identify groups which have been at a disadvantageous situation for long and advertising 
impacting the developing economy, in this case India. The case for India becomes even 
strongeras informal sector constitutes almost 85% of labor market. The magnitude of this 
disadvantageous behaviour would also be important for policymakers to bring out an 
inclusive growth. The most commonly used methods for measuring the magnitude of 
disadvantage is through a Blinder and Oaxaca decomposition. This has been used to account 
for gender wage discrimination in India. Kumar and Manisha (2008) used Oaxaca 
decomposition technique to calculate the earnings inequality among individuals belonging to 
different caste and religion. They concluded that over the period from 1987 to 1999 the 
earnings difference has declined while that between Muslims and Non-Muslims hasincreased. 
Much of the difference in earnings can be explained by the corresponding educational 
endowments and returns on ageMadheswaran and Attewell (2007) have found using NSS 
data that 15% of the wage gap between higher castes and scheduled castes/tribes in regular 
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salaried labour market in urban areas are purely due to discrimination and it is much more 
severe in the private sector.  Vani (2005) also confirms the fact that “at least one-third of the 
average income/probability differences between Hindu and SC/ST households was due to the 
“unequal treatment” of the latter”. Few other studies are Malathy and Duraisamy (2014), 
Sohini andBikas (2012), Louis and Konstantinos (2010), Barrry and Vasudeva (2005) and 
Simonetta et.al. (2013). Disadvantage could be a result of multiple factors but in our paper we 
have three variables i.e. education, presence of expanding informal sector and regional 
development. According to Ravi (1998)the majority of those going for long term migration 
belong to the General caste and OBCs. ST/SCs and Muslims rarely migrate. Rakesh Basant 
(2012) analysed patterns of Muslim participation in education and employment using three 
rounds of NSSO data i.e. 1999/00, 2004/05 and 2009/10 and confirmed the fact that the 
performance of Muslims are poor. The participation of Muslims in higher education is also 
equally poor. The dropout rates are also among the highest which increases significantly after 
middle school.Poor quality education and lack of appropriate skill forces most of ST/SCs and 
Muslims to stay back. Though a lot of literature has covered wage differential between 
genders and socio-religious groups, they have not included the concept of informal sector 
with respect to regional development. Our paper attempts to include this so that magnitude 
and trend of disadvantage with respect to respective socio-religious group can be calculated. 
Proper identification of groups are important to attain truly inclusive growth.  
There exists a gap in literature regarding this aspect. This paper also attempts to answer the 
following questions. 
1) Whether any disadvantages exists in the labour market? If it exists what is its trend? 
2) Whether education, development or existence of informal sector is an important factor 
explaining this disadvantage?  
3. Data and Methodology: 
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National sample surveys employment and unemployment data for the 50th (93/94), 61st 
(2004/05) and 68th (2011/12) rounds has been used to perform an analysis. The weekly total 
wage for activity serial number one has been considered. The weekly earnings are deflated to 
derive real earnings using the Consumer Price Index of Industrial Workers (base year = 2001) 
for the respective rounds to take care of the inflation. Reclassification of the social religious 
groups has been done which is as follows:  
1) Upper Hindus - HU (Hindus from the general category and OBC’s)3,  
2) Muslims- MUS (Muslims from all categories),  
5) Other religious- ORM Minorities (ORM).  
3) Lower Hindus-HL (Hindus SC/STs),  
Muslims were not divided as Lower and Upper as this division would reduce the number of 
observations under either of categories.  
The education status was classified into three main categories: 1) Illiterates, 2) Upto Middle 
education and 3) Secondary and above. The three main categories were done to avoid the 
problem of low sample . The states were classified into three groups i.e. Developed, 
developing and least developed states as per following equation 
Grouping Criteria = (Average of PCNSDP over 20 years for each state + Standard Deviation 
of PCNSDP over 20 years for each state)4. 
The categories of states also represents the stages of economic growth, wherein developing 
states are the ones still in transition phase with those developed have already reformed and 
                                                           
3General Category and OBC’s were combined because in 50th round OBCs were subsumed in General Category. 
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4Per capita income is measured by per capita net state domestic product (PCNSDP) at factor cost at 2004-05 
constant prices 
If (Average + Standard Deviation) >= 37517 then the state is to be considered as Developed States, If (Average 
+ Standard Deviation) >25064 but <37517 then the state is to be considered as Developing States, If (Average + 
Standard Deviation) <= 25064 then the state is to be considered as Least Developing States (Barrow &Salai-I-
Martin (1995)  
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have reached a high growth trajectory. Least developed are the ones not yet developed (see 
Table 1).  
“ insert table 1 below” 
 
The casual and salaried workers were  adapted from NSS. This was to account for the 
difference in wages earned by workers employed in formal and informal sectors.  
We use Mincerian equation of real earnings on factors related to age, education, development 
and regular/salaried wage for each socio-religious group. Then this was used to decompose 
the wage gap between respective groups keeping Hindus Upper (HU) as benchmark category.  
The Mincerian form (Mincer, 1974) of earnings equation was assumed as follows: 
iiii
iiiii
gularWageopedStatesLeastDevelStatesDeveloping
uptomiddleilliterateageageLnE
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Where Ei is the real daily wage of the ith individual which is taken as a function of age and 
age2 (proxy for accumulated experience), level of education attained. 5 The Mincerian earning 
equation is also controlled for Indian States which have been classified into a) developed 
states, b) developing states and c) least developed states and for casual orsalaried individuals 
by using dummies respectively. We do not include “secondary and above”, “developed 
states” and “casuaal wage workers” in the earnings equation so as to avoid multicollinearlity. 
The effects of which are subsumed in the constant term.Here the reference category is an 
individual who has completed “secondary or above” education level and working in a 
                                                           
51) Illiterates,2) Till middle and 3) secondary education and above.  
 
 
  
8 
 
developed state as a salaried worker.ThisMincerian equation was run for all four major socio-
religious groups. 
The estimates from above Mincer equationareare provided in the table 3 (appendix). Durbin–
Wu–Hausman test was conducted to account for endogeneity. Endogeneity leads to bias in 
coefficients. The results show possible endogeneity issues with the inclusion of regular wage 
worker dummy. But still we consider this equation as by inclusion of this dummy variable 
greatly improves estimation.All numbers in the table 3 have been explained with respect to 
this category. Then the real wages of respective groups were compared and wage gaps 
calculated. The main objective of calculating the wage gap was to decompose it into two 
main effects: endowments effects and coefficients effect. The Coeffecient effects indicates 
possible structural dis-advantage. 
In order to decompose the wage gap we use Blinder Oaxaca methodology. The 
decomposition is necessary in order to explain the reasons for huge differences in wages 
across socio-religious groups.  
Blinder and Oaxaca (B-O) Decomposition 
We use the estimated Mincerian equations for respective groups to decompose the wage gap 
into endowment effects (or characteristics) and coefficients effects. Specifically, we use 
Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973) algorithm. Blinder and Oaxaca (1973) were first 
economists who estimated the wage gaps between groups of individuals and their causes. 
Basically, Blinder and Oaxaca (B-O) decomposition technique has been used to measure 
wage differentials between men and women, and between black and white.  
Following form of algorithm was considered: 
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Where  is the predicted mean (log) earning; h and l refers to the groups with higher and 
lower earnings, respectively; 
 is the mean vector of earnings determining variables 
(education, age, experience, state categories, work status),   is a vector of the estimated 
returns to the earnings determinants and the last term represents the interaction effect.  
If an individual belonging to different groups and having similar endowment in terms of 
personal characteristics such as sex, and race but still receive lower wages than other then it 
is due to unexplained factors also called coefficients effects. This we term as structural 
disadvantage. In our paper we assume that there may exists certain socio-religious group/s 
which may be experiencing disadvantagesatthe hands of others. Due to lack of data regarding 
many qualitative aspects important for wage determination the measured discrimination is 
over estimated. Hence, we use the term structural disadvantage. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
The Mean age of workforce which used to range from 33 years to 36 years in 1993/94 have 
increased to 34 years to 38 years (see Table 2). The workforce belonging to MUS are 
relatively young compared to ORM and HU. High rates of education attainment among HU 
and ORM have pushed their working age higher averaging about 37 years in 2011/12. This is  
evident by the higher proportion of work force in education group “edu3” . On the other 
hand, majority of MUS and HL are less educated. Between these two, MUS are in a slightly 
better position in terms of proportion of those attained secondary or higher education in 
2011/12. But overtime, an increasing proportion of HL are attaining higher education. This 
proportion has increased from 16% in 2004/05 to 27% in 2011/12.  
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As per the aveagereal weekly wage in concerned. ORM followed by HU receives the highest 
wages across all three NSS rounds. HL receives the lowest among all religious group. This 
could be due to other low performing socio economic factors. The pitiable conditions of HL 
are also evident from the highproportion of them involved in casual/informal jobs. All other 
religious groups have significantly higher proportion of salaried individuals.  A stark 
difference can also be seen in the distribution of working population among religious groups 
across various development categories of state. Ravi(1998) has claimed in his research that 
long term migration is mostly done by labourers belonging to higher classes/castes. Since 
most of  labourers belonging to high caste shift to developed states, then it can be claimed 
that they normally move in search of long term formal job appointments. Therefore those left 
in developing or least developed states are normally engaged in informal contracts and as per 
Ravi (1998) individuals belonging to lower caste normally don’t migrate or even if they 
migrate it is for short period of time. Then it can be comfortably concluded that majority of 
HL or MUS are employed in developing and least developed states. This also comes up in 
descriptive statistics (Table 2). 
“Insert table 2 below” 
 
In 2011/12, majority of HL worked in least developed states while majority of MUS worked 
in developing states. A higher proportion of workforce belonging to HU and ORM normally 
worked in developed states.  Developed states are normally better equipped to provide better 
working conditions, health benefits, pension, insurance etc. and have a large formal sector as 
compared to least developed states.Therefore, with this explanation majority of ORM and HU 
are well off as compared to MUS and HL. Between MUS and HL, on an average majority of 
MUS work in developing states, while majority of HL work in least developed states. 
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Developing states though not as good as developed states but are still better equipped than 
least developed states in terms of social protection and size of formal labour market. The 
classsifiction of developed, developing and least developed states were done in order to factor 
in the size of formal labour market in defferent development scenarios. So, MUS are better 
than HL but still performing worse than HU and ORM. This finding is consistent with the 
Sachar Committee’s report (2006). 
Also, majority of MUS and HL are still employed in the informal sectors as indicated by the 
percentage involved in casual labour. Almost 57% and 79% of the labour force belonging to 
MUS and HL respectively were working as casual labourers in 1993/94. This proportion fell 
down to 50% and 62% respectively for MUS and HL in 2011/12. That means the proportion 
of regular salaried workers belonging to MUS and HL are increasing. This is a good sign. 
This may be due to the favourable policy of reservation in formal institutions.  
In the next section we try to locate significant factors which may affect the weekly earnings 
of the various socio-religious groups across NSS periods of 1993/94 to 2011/12. 
5. Analysis  
In this section we analyse the signs and magnitude of explanatory variables of the Mincerian 
equation ie. age, experience, education, development, casual/regular salary work status which 
is likely to explain the real weekly wage across socio-religious groups and periods from 
1993/94 to 2011/12. We hypothesize that all the explanatory variables would contribute 
positively to the real weekly wage.  
1) Age plays a positive and significant role in determining real wage for almost all the 
religious groups and for all the NSS rounds. The inverted “U” shaped  relationship 
between the earnings and age explains the development of human capital (Gray (1993), 
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Ben (1967) and Mincer (1974)) wherein at initial stage (upto certain middle age) the 
productivity increases at a higher pace due to gain in experience but thereafter flattens 
off eventually declining at a faster pace post retirement. The inverted “U” shape is 
significant for all the religious groups.  
2) The returns from education are represented by the coefficient of respective education 
categories in table 3 (Appendix)6.  Illiterates get lower real wages across all religious 
groups compared to those educated with secondary and aboveie benchmark category. 
Similarly, real wages were also lower for those having middle level schooling. The trend 
was similar for all the NSS rounds (ILO, 2008). This follows from the human capital 
theory where labours are rewarded as per their skill and education. It’s assumed that 
labourers who are more educated would be more productive.  
3) Now we analyse the effect in real weekly wages across religious groups if one works in 
developed, developing or least developing states/regions. Clearly it can be seen that if a 
salaried worker working in developed states and migrates to a lesser developed state ie: 
developing states, his/her wage falls across all religious groups in all NSS periods. On an 
average, fall in real weekly wage is even greater if an individual migrates from a 
developed category of states to a group of least category of states. Least developed states 
have less specialized activities compared to developed states and therefore on an average 
real wages are slightly lower as compared to the developed state. This means that the 
formal labour market is smaller as that of in developed states.  
4) Now we see the effect on an individual’s real weekly wage if his status changes from 
salaried to casual worker. The negative and significant effect in real weekly wage is 
observed in all the rounds across all religious groups. Salaried workers are employed in 
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the formal sector while casual workers normally are employed in informal sector. The 
explanation for lower real wages follows from the theory of market segmentation.  
Finally we consider real weekly wage of salaried7 workers working in developed states across 
religious groups for all periods. Here we find that the average real weekly wage for the 
salaried workers who are educated upto secondary or above and working in a developed state 
are highest for HL followed by ORM and lowest for HU. This is consistent across all periods. 
According to the descriptive table 2, majority of HU are working in formal sector as indicated 
by proportion of salaried workers while relatively less proportion are from HL. So there 
exists tough competition among HU while less or relatively lower competition among those 
belonging to HL. Moreover, HL gets reservation in formal sector of developed states where 
HU have to face tough competition in order to enjoy such benefits leading to a higher wage 
for HL relative tothat of HU. ORM gets more because they are better skilled and educated 
compared to HU and MUS. 
“Insert Table 3 here” 
Now we attempt to explain the wage gap between various socio-religious group using Blinder 
Oaxaca decomposition.  
“Insert table 4 here” 
The real weekly wages are significantly different between all religious groups. HU receive 
relatively higher wage on an average as compared to Muslims and HL but lower than ORM. 
The real wage gap was decomposed into endowment effects, coefficient’s effect and 
interaction effect. The endowment effect is also called explained effect while the combination 
of coefficient’s effect and interaction effect is called unexplained effect.   
                                                           
7We have considered the exponential of the constants since the real weekly wage was logged in the Mincerian 
equation.    
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1) The endowment effect explains almost 100% of the real wage gap between HU and MUS 
across all NSS rounds while it explains only 86% - 76% between HU and HL. On the 
other hand it explains 21% -50% between HU and ORM. The residual is due to 
unexplained factors. The residual is also called as unexplained effects. This has been 
termed as structural disadvantage in our paper. This effect does not exist between HU and 
MUS across all NSS rounds but it significantly increases between HU and HL from 
1993/94 to 2011/12. That means HL are in the “dis-advantageous” position relative to 
HU. Whereas HU is considered to be in a dis-advantageous position relative to that of 
ORM across all NSS rounds, but the magnitude is falling.  
2) The endowment explains factors which are responsible for the wage gap not due to 
structural disadvantage. Education was the important factor which explained on an 
average 35% to 56% of the difference in wage gap between HU with MUS and HU with 
HL across all periods. This explains that MUS and HL are not able to get quality 
education which forces them to take up low paying jobs.MUS have been trained in 
madrasaas (religious insitutions) where the curriculum avoids inclusion of subjects which 
are popular in job markets thus making them ineligible for jobs in formal institutions. HL 
are educated in public schools which dos not impart good quality education as teaches 
rarely turn up for  classes. This hampers the skill development of students belonging to 
HL and MUS. 30%-50% of the wage difference against HL and MUS was due to the 
location specific reasons ie. developing state while this could explain 22% to 100% of the 
wage gap of HU and ORM in 1993/94 and 2011/12 respectively. This means if MUS and 
HU migrates to a developed state given other factors constant then their real wages would 
be comparable to that of HU and ORM respectively. Casual status of an individual 
explains 30% to 50% of the wage gap against MUS and HL across all periods. This 
proves that on an average MUS and HL work in informal sector and therefore shift to 
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formal institutions would increase their wage to that of HU. Age also explains almost 
50% to 90% of wage difference against HL. This represents that HL are young as 
compared to HU and therefore they receive lower wage. 
Therefore, overall we could see except ORM none of the religious groups are better 
endowed with respect to the benchmark category HU. This means HU and ORM are well 
endowed with quality education and better working conditions with respect toMUS and 
HL. This high endowment explains a major part of the high wage received by them. 
3) Now we compare the residual effect which we term in our paper as structural 
disadvantage which is defined if a group is structurally discriminated not only by the 
wilful acts of particular individuals but because the prevailing system of opportunities 
and constraints favours the success of one group over another group. There exists no 
structural disadvantage against MUS but significantly increasing disadvantage against 
HL. Most of HL are employed as causal labourers in informal sector and therefore is 
worse off in this sense. They are not hired in formal institutions because the employers 
consider them unsuitable to private institutions. This explains by almost 100%. Whereas 
most of HL are in least developed states and therefore seen as incapable of performing 
effectively in developed states. This only existed in 1993/94 but have vanished 
completely. Discrimination against HU with respect to ORM was due to experience. HU 
is normally considered in-experienced as compared to ORM and this explained almost 
100% of the difference. But the magnitude of this factor have been reducing overtime 
and in 2011/12 it just explained 30% of wage gap.  
6. Conclusion:  
The labour market in India has been segmented into formal and informal sector. More than 
85% of labour force is engaged in informal sector. Since informal sector does not follow 
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labour laws such provision of minimum wage and social security, there is enough scope for 
differential treatment against certain weaker sections of society. This can be due to “a legacy 
of historical discrimination, contemporary state policies and practices and accumulation of 
disadvantage (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). This paper tried to locate such groups which were 
treated differently. It also attempts to measure the magnitude and identify trend across 
1993/94 to 2011/12. Finally, it also attempted to look for factors which could explain this 
differential treatment or so called structural discrimination. After a cursory look through the 
data, we found that majority of HL and MUS are illiterate and very few have studied upto 
higher education while it was just opposite for ORM and HU. But the increasing trend of HL 
becoming highly educated gives some positive hopes. More than majority of HU and ORM 
while fewer MUS and HL work in formal sectors in developed states. Most of MUS and HL 
are employed in the informal sector of developing and least developed states. This gives a 
clue to the pitiable conditions of most of MUS and HL lived and worked in. Devoid of 
minimum wage and social protection might have made their living standards poor. HL had 
the highest proportion having casual status. But the good news is that wages of an average 
HL have been the highest or close to highest in developed states across all rounds and socio-
religious groups. This may have been due to the reservation policy.  Finally coming back to 
the measurement of the wage gap and explaining its factors. 100% of the difference in real 
wages between HU and MUS was due to the endowment effect. Good quality education 
explained most part of it. According to data they are not facing any structural disadvantage by 
HU and therefore would be better off with better quality education. Rest of the difference was 
again due to location specific reasons and because they worked in informal sector. Good 
quality education would go a long way to improve their chances for better opportunities in 
formal sector. While against HL there existed an increasing structural disadvantage trend. 
This is a worrying issue. Almost 50% of the wage gap was due to structural disadvantage and 
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rest was due to endowment effect. Majority of endowment effect can be explained due to low 
quality of education. Being employed in informal sectors as casual labourers and working in 
least developed states could explain most of the difference in wage gap due to structural 
disadvantage. Suggesting that HL are in a disadvantageous position working in an informal 
sector and belonging to a lesser developed regions of the country. ORM are the most well off 
and get paid on an average higher than HU. They are better educated and have regular 
salaried jobs.  
Therefore finally, we were able to answer the research question with which we started. 
Disadvantages which we called structural disadvantage against a particular group does exist 
in India especially against HL relative to HU and against HU relative to that of ORM. But 
what is a cause for worry is that the dis-advantage against HL has been increasing overtime 
whereas against HU has considerable fallen. Increase of better quality of middle and higher 
education along with more reservations for ST/SCs in formal institutions can lead to decrease 
in the magnitude of structural dis-advantage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
18 
 
References 
Alan, S. Blinder. 1973. Wage Discrimination: Reduced form and Structural Estimates, 
Journal of Human Resources 8, 436-455. 
Amaral, Pedro. S and Quintin. Erwan. 2006. A Competitive Model of the Informal Sector, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 53 (7), 1541-1553.  
Becker, Gary. S. 1993. Nobel Lecture: The economic Way of looking at Behaviour, The 
Journal of Political Economy 101 (3), 385-409. 
Banerjee, Biswajit. 1983. The Role of the Informal Sector in the Migration Process: A Test of 
Probabilistic Migration Models and Labour Market Segmentation for India, Oxford 
Economic Papers 35 (3), 399-422. 
Basant, Rakesh. 2012. Education and Employment among Muslims in India: An Analysis of 
Patterns and Trends, Working Paper, No. 2012-09-03, Indian Institute of Management, 
Ahmedabad. 
Bhaumik, Suman. Kumar and Charkrabarty, Manisha. 2008. Earnings Inequality in India: 
Has the rise of Caste and Religion based Politics in India had an Impact?, Discussion paper 
no. 2008, ForschungsinstitutzurZukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labour. 
Borooah, Vani. K. 2005. Caste, Inequality, and Poverty in India, Review of Development 
Economics 9 (3), 399-414. 
Borooah, Vani. K. et. al. 2007. The Effectiveness of Jobs Reservation: Caste, Religion and 
Economic Status in India, Development and Change 38, no. 3: 423-445. 
Christofides, Louis. N and Vrachimis, Konstantinos. 2010. The Gender Wage Gap 
Experience in the European Union with Special Reference to Cyprus, Available at: 
  
19 
 
https://www.ucy.ac.cy/unesco/documents/unesco/Articles_20102010_conference/Christofid 
Vrachimis_paper.pdf. 
Das, Maitreyi Bordia. 2013. Exclusion and Discrimination in the Labour Market, Background 
Paper for The World Development Report 2013. 
Duraisamy, Malathy and Duraisamy, P. 2014. Occupational Segregation, Wage and Job 
Discrimination against Women across Social Groups in the Indian Labour Market: 1983-
2010, Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India. 
Employment and Unemployment Surveys 50th, 61st and 68th rounds, National Sample 
Survey. 
Heintz, James and Robert, Pollin. 2003. Informalization, Economic Growth and Challenge of 
Creating Viable Labour Standards in Developing Countries, Working paper series No. 60. 
PERI, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA. 
Karan, Anup. K and Selvaraj, Sakthivel. 2008. Trends in Wages and Earning in India: 
Increasing Wage Differential in a Segmented Labour Market, International Labour 
Organization, Geneva.  
Leontaridi, Marianthi. 1998. Segmented Labour Market: Theory and Evidence, Journal of 
Economic Survey 12 (1), 63-101. 
Longhi, Simonetta et. al. 2013. Explained and Unexplained Wage Gaps across the Main 
Ethno-Religious Groups in Great Britain, Oxford Economic Papers 65, 471-493. 
ILO (1972). Employment, Incomes, and Equity: A Strategy for Increasing Productive 
Employment in Kenya, International Labour Organization, Geneva. 
  
20 
 
Mincer, Jacob. 1974. Education, Experience and the Distribution of Earnings and 
Employment: An overview. Chapter in Education, Income and Human Behaviour by F. 
Thomas Juster. 
Paul, Sohini and Paul, Sourabh. Bikas. 2012. Trade Reforms and Gender Wage gap in India, 
http://paa2013.princeton.edu/papers/131268 (assessed January 24, 2015).  
Pincus, Fred. L. 1996. Discrimination Comes in Many Forms: Individual, Institution, and 
Structural, The American Behavioural Scientist 40 (2).   
Pager, Devah and Shepherd, Hana. 2008. The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial 
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20689680 (assessed January 28, 2015).  
Porath, Y. Ben. 1967. The Production of Human capital and life cycle of earnings. Journal of 
Political Economy 75, 325-365. 
Reilly, Barry and Dutta, Puja. Vasudeva. 2005. The Gender Pay Gap and Trade 
Liberalisation: Evidence for India, Working Paper No. 32, PRUS. 
Ronald, Oaxaca. 1973. Male-Female wage Differentials in Urban Labour Markets, 
International Economic Review 14: 693-709. 
Sen, Kunal. et. al. 2013. Efficiency Comparison between Formal and Informal Firms- 
Evidence from Indian Manufacturing, The Journal of Industrial Statistics 2 (1), 1-23.  
S, Madheswaran and Pail, Attewell. 2007. Caste Discrimination in the Indian Urban Labour 
Market: Evidence from the National Sample Survey, Economic & Political Weekly (India) 13 
October, 4146-53. 
  
21 
 
Srivastava, Ravi. 1998. Migration and the Labour Market in India, The Indian Journal of 
Labour Economics 41 (4), 583-616. 
Todaro, Michael. P. 1969. A Model of Labour Migration Urban Unemployment in Less 
Developed Countries. The American Economic Review 59 (1), 138-148.  
Thorat, Sukhadeo and Newman, Katherine. S. 2007. Caste and Economic Discrimination: 
Causes, Consequences and Remedies, Economic and Political Weekly.  
NCEUS. 2008. Contribution of the Unorganized sector to GDP Report of the Sub Committee 
of a NCEUS Task Force. Working Paper. 2, National Commission for Enterprises in the 
Unorganized Sector, New Delhi.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
22 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Classification of States 
State Classification 
Developed  Developing  Least Developed 
Goa Andhra Pradesh Assam 
Gujarat Arunachal Pradesh Bihar 
Haryana Jammu & Kashmir Jharkhand 
Himachal Pradesh Karnataka Madhya Pradesh 
Kerala Meghalaya Chhattisgarh 
Maharashtra Tripura Manipur 
Nagaland West Bengal Orissa 
Punjab   Rajasthan 
Sikkim   Uttar Pradesh 
Tamil Nadu     
Uttarakhand     
Andaman &     
Nicobar Islands     
Chandigarh     
Delhi     
Pondicherry     
Source: As per author’s calculation 
  
0 
 
Table 2:Descriptive Statistics for 1993/94, 2004/5 and 2011/12 across religious groups (HU. MUS, ORM, HL) 
 
1993/94 2004-05 2011-12 
 
HU MU ORM HL HU MU ORM HL HU MU ORM HL 
 
Mean 
 (S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Age 35.29 
(11.62) 
33.38 
(11.89) 
35.36 
(11.26) 
34.15 
(11.99) 
35.81 
(11.61) 
33.59 
(11.96) 
36.68 
(11.19) 
34.68 
(11.80) 
37.37 
(11.44) 
34.89 
(11.74) 
38.11 
(11.09) 
36.07 
(11.65) 
Real weekly wage 
 
627.44 
(723.67) 
442.79 
(457.35) 
686.37 
(659.34) 
292.90 
(351.92) 
840.88 
(1140.24) 
651.50 
(725.01) 
1092.86 
(1100.26) 
483.39 
(583.19) 
1352.99 
(1602.91) 
1059.87 
(1154.86) 
1707.67 
(4760.73) 
853.69 
(950.40) 
Salaried 
wage earnerd 
0.56 
 
 
0.43 
 
 
0.58 
 
 
0.21 
 
0.56 
 
 
0.46 
 
 
0.65 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
0.61 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.69 
 
 
0.38 
 
 
Casual WageEarnerd 
 
0.46 0.57 0.42 0.79 0.44 0.34 0.55 0.69 0.39 0.50 0.31 0.62 
Developed Stated 
 
0.42 
 
0.29 
 
0.65 
 
0.30 
 
0.46 
 
0.29 
 
0.63 
 
0.35 
 
0.45 
 
0.27 
 
0.58 
 
0.34 
 
Developing Stated 
 
0.27 
 
0.30 
 
0.23 
 
0.26 0.25 
 
0.39 
 
0.23 
 
0.26 
 
0.23 
 
0.43 
 
0.29 
 
0.26 
 Least Developed Stated 
 
0.31 
 
0.41 
 
0.12 
 
0.45 
 
0.29 
 
0.32 
 
0.14 
 
0.39 
 
0.31 
 
0.30 
 
0.13 
 
0.40 
 Illiteracyd 0.29 0.42 0.25 0.62 0.23 0.31 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.24 0.10 0.31 
Primary Educationd 0.34 
 
0.40 
 
0.35 
 
0.29 
 
0.38 
 
0.45 
 
0.38 
 
0.40 
 
0.34 
 
0.42 
 
0.32 
 
0.42 
 Secondary and aboved 
 
0.37 
 
0.18 
 
0.40 
 
0.09 
 
0.39 
 
0.24 
 
0.46 
 
0.16 
 
0.50 
 
0.34 
 
0.58 
 
0.27 
 *(**)[***]{****} Significant at the 10%(5%)[1%]{0.1%} level of alpha error probability, values in brackets are standard deviations. 
d
 Dummy variable. 
 Source: As per author’s calculation 
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Table 3: Determinants of Mincerian equation 
Source: As per author’s calculation, Note: d Dummy variable. 
Dependent  
Variable : 
logged real 
wage (INR) 
1993/94 2004/05 2011/12 
Hindu  
Upper 
Muslim  
 
ORM  Hindu  
Lower 
Hindu  
Upper 
Muslim  ORM  Hindu  
Lower 
Hindu  
Upper 
Muslim  
 
ORM  Hindu 
Lower 
Age 0.066**** 0.066**** 0.05**** 0.042**** 0.066**** 0.060**** 0.055**** 0.048**** 0.062**** 0.069**** 0.06**** 0.042**** 
Agesq 
-0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** -0.001**** 
Illiterated 
-0.979**** -0.772**** -0.663**** -0.772**** -1.097**** -0.928**** -0.94**** -0.891**** -0.903**** -0.755**** -0.763**** -0.775**** 
UptoMiddled 
-0.575**** -0.477**** -0.488**** -0.493**** -0.654**** -0.593**** -0.578**** -0.531**** -0.624**** -0.546**** -0.561**** -0.528**** 
Developing 
Statesd 
-0.015 -0.038 -0.104**** -0.016 -0.108**** 0.056** 0.11**** -0.086**** -0.083**** 0.037* 0.102**** -0.048**** 
Least 
Developed 
Stated 
-0.024** -0.025 -0.142**** -0.068**** -0.046**** -0.045** -0.185**** -0.037*** -0.096**** -0.076**** -0.137**** -0.057**** 
Casual work 
statusd 
-0.694**** -0.511**** -0.619**** -0.743**** -0.629**** -0.464**** -0.68**** -0.664**** -0.495**** -0.288**** -0.527**** -0.416**** 
Const. 4.693**** 4.81**** 5.102**** 5.090**** 4.816**** 5.097**** 5.091**** 5.102**** 5.345**** 5.373**** 5.414**** 5.703**** 
F statistic 4857.11 371.16 412.55 1104.55 5998.85 837.32 1078.87 2334.20 3217.60 571.00 569.28 1258.98 
R square 0.452 0.282 0.316 0.270 0.510 0.424 0.496 0.430 0.394 0.335 0.381 0.338 
No. of 
obs. 
41226 6609 6274 20949 40300 7962 7690 21665 34682 7935 6475 17281 
  
 
 
Table 4: Oaxaca decomposition 
Log(real weekly earnings) 1993/94 2004/05 2011/12 
High HU HU HU HU HU HU HU HU HU 
Low MUS HL ORM MUS HL ORM MUS HL ORM 
Difference 0.256 0.601 -0.118 0.158 0.461 -0.282 0.177 0.371 -0.220 
          
Endowments (E) 0.260 0.518 -0.026 0.223 0.390 -0.113 0.200 0.282 -0.108 
Age 0.135 0.050 0.001 0.142 0.054 -0.029 0.181 0.056 -0.034 
Age squared -0.098 -0.036 -0.004 -0.092 -0.036 0.014 -0.126 -0.035 0.019 
Illiterate 0.110 0.251 -0.005 0.086 0.183 -0.031 0.071 0.112 -0.025 
Upto Middle  0.029 -0.018 -0.001 0.039 0.015 -0.009 0.045 0.047 -0.015 
Developing  0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.005 
Least developed 0.003 0.008 -0.027 0.001 0.003 -0.026 0.000 0.004 -0.025 
Salary worker 0.080 0.264 0.013 0.055 0.170 -0.033 0.037 0.096 -0.024 
          
Coefficient (without constant) (C) 0.047 0.424 0.294 0.138 0.308 0.096 -0.072 0.388 -0.056 
Age -0.018 0.805 0.564 0.206 0.612 0.406 -0.236 0.723 0.088 
Age squared 0.104 -0.239 -0.234 -0.004 -0.147 -0.192 0.184 -0.266 -0.038 
Illiterate -0.087 -0.125 -0.084 -0.051 -0.085 -0.028 -0.035 -0.037 -0.016 
Upto Middle  -0.039 -0.025 -0.030 -0.027 -0.050 -0.028 -0.033 -0.041 -0.019 
Developing  0.007 0.000 0.021 -0.065 -0.006 -0.049 -0.051 -0.009 -0.053 
Least developed 0.001 0.019 0.014 0.000 -0.004 0.020 -0.006 -0.015 0.005 
  
 
 
Casual work status 0.080 -0.012 0.043 0.080 -0.012 -0.033 0.106 0.032 -0.022 
Constant (Co) -0.124 -0.397 -0.409 -0.281 -0.286 -0.275 -0.028 -0.358 -0.068 
Interaction (I) 0.073 0.055 0.023 -0.143 0.049 0.010 0.076 0.059 0.012 
          
E /(E+C+Co+I)* 101.5 86.3 21.9 141.1 84.7 40.1 113.2 76.1 49.1 
Source: As per author’s calculation, * % of endowments in total wage gap, the residual of which has been termed as the magnitude of structural dis-advantage. 
 
 
 
 
 
